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The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1547 standard
addresses the integration of distributed energy resources (DER) into area
electric power system (AEPS). First released in 2003, with multiple revisions
ongoing, the most recent version from 2018 is used in this thesis to develop
several use cases to assess the stability risks in the presence of cyberadver-
saries. The updated standard specifies the need for more flexible settings,
requiring DER to remain connected during certain disturbances and provide
voltage support via active and reactive power modes.
The advent of these functionalities also introduces possible risks where
certain settings combinations, which, while allowable under the standard,
may actually create instability. The notion that DER should be equipped
with a communication interface to be able to communicate with the AEPS
operator exposes DER to numerous attack vectors from cyberadversaries.
This concern is amplified as DER penetration increases, where under a
reasonable threat model, multiple DER could be attacked simultaneously.
Through several illustrative use cases, this thesis addresses in detail how
potentially adverse combinations of mode change, mode setting parameters,
and ride-through and tripping settings could lead to instability. The use
cases are then validated through simulations of a hypothetical AEPS with
varying degrees of DER penetration. It was concluded that certain adverse
mode changes or settings, whether through error or cyberattack, can lead to
unstable conditions with DER penetration as low as 24% of the AEPS system
capacity. This is a motivation to look into possible mitigation strategies on
both the cybersecurity and cyberphysical sides of the problem.
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Policymakers across the United States are reacting to calls for grid modern-
ization and demands for cleaner energy by setting aggressive goals to reduce
carbon output. From 50% clean renewable energy in California by 2030, to
100% clean energy in Hawaii by 2045, to 70% renewable energy in New York
by 2030 [2–4], these policies show the emphasis the United States is plac-
ing on the green movement by being careful about where their electricity is
Figure 1.1: United States map for RPS goals [1]
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coming from. The United States map shown in Figure 1.1 shows a few other
states’ goals in a more descriptive and granular manner.
Though clean and renewable energy can come from a variety of sources, in-
cluding nuclear, geothermal, and hydroelectric, almost all initiatives include
plans for expanding distributed energy resources (DER), such as solar, wind,
and storage. For example, there are more than 2.3 million solar generators
on the U.S. distribution system today, with steady growth expected in the
future [6]. Ability to adjust the system size of DER geographically as per
the demand, and having the generation and load close to each other, are two
main reasons for the appeal of DER. This adaptive nature and flexibility in
deploying DER has motivated in their rise across the United States.
Another instance where localized DER systems can help the system be
more resilient is when disruption occurs because of natural disasters and
hazards. During these times, the power system can be reconfigured into
Figure 1.2: Evolution of IEEE standard and California Rule 21 [5]
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independent secure segments that each contain load and generation which
can enhance grid resilience to keep critical services online and restore service
faster with help from the fast-responding power electronics in solar generation
and energy storage systems [6].
This expected growth in DER motivated the update to the IEEE 1547
standard on DER interconnections with the grid. Figure 1.2 shows the time-
line of the evolution of the IEEE 1547 standard alongside California Rule 21
which also covers the requirement standards for the connection of DER. The
working group in 2003 did not foresee that DER would achieve such high
penetration and did not consider continuous DER operation as important to
the grid [7]. The original standard required DER to immediately trip off for
any disturbances and did not require DER to actively regulate voltage or fre-
quency. Immediate tripping in response to a disturbance might have been a
viable response when DER were a small proportion of the grid. At that time,
losing their little generation would not have severely affected the demand,
nor would the participation of DER in active regulation of frequency and
voltage been of great significance. Thus, in order to safeguard DER without
having to worry too much about its impact on the grid, DER were required
to be tripped off in response to frequency and voltage deviations.
However, this approach is no longer feasible when DER form a major
proportion of the grid. Not only would the grid lose huge amounts of DER
supplying the distribution load, but this loss might affect the stability of
the area electric power system (AEPS). In response to this realization, and
seeing the continued rise of DER, the revised standard requires DER to
provide reactive power support, ride through certain disturbances, and only
trip when a threshold determined by the AEPS is reached. It can be seen from
the timeline how it went from “shall not” to “may” to “shall” in the 2003,
2014, and 2018 versions of the standard with regard to DER’s requirement on
the engagement of ride-through and active response to voltage and frequency
deviations. This update requires the addition of more complex features to
the control systems and power electronics of DER inverters and opens up
possibilities for both grid support modes and islanding modes.
Another feature that sets apart the IEEE 2018 standard from previous
revisions is the communication interface. With increasing number of DER
meeting the load through coordinated generation, it is necessary to have
communication among DER, and with the main grid. Figure 1.3 shows com-
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Figure 1.3: Control protocol in/out of scope mapping [8]
munication protocol requirements where the local DER interface that talks
between the managing entity and DER is within the scope of the standard.
This smart feature, however, exposes the system to several cybersecurity risks
where an adversary may spoof the communication messages to compromise
the system. Ongoing research has revealed the importance of cybersecurity
for DER and IEEE 1547−2018 leaves the issue up to mutual agreement from
the DER and AEPS and local regulations [8].
It is inevitable that the increased communications and capabilities natu-
rally result in potential attack surfaces. These attack surfaces could arise as
a result of exploitation by an adversary, or they could be exposed by error,
creating adverse conditions. Ongoing research points to the importance of
cybersecurity of DER [9–12]. In response to that, the IEEE 1547.3 work-
ing group is currently drafting a companion cybersecurity guide. Though
the details will be more clear after drafting the IEEE 1547.3, it is obvious
that there is flexibility in the extended capabilities of DER described in the
standard that could create adverse conditions through malicious or mistaken
combinations of modes.
There has been a lot of research exploring the possibilities of cyberattack
and ways to mitigate them with reference to the new IEEE 1547 standard.
Based on the literature review, the most commonly known attack types are
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man-in-the-middle, replay, eavesdropping, spoofing through security certifi-
cates, denial of service, least privilege violation, and brute force credential
harvesting [13], [14].
The standard specifies that the communication interface may use Sun-
Spec Modbus or Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) for communication,
with more recent consideration of International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC) 61850 Generic Object Oriented System-wide Events (GOOSE). These
are protocols that are already widely used in power systems. Among the pro-
tocols, SunSpec Modbus is the simplest and has no security measures whereas
DNP3 has a few security measures, such as authentication and message in-
tegrity check [13]. A new coordination strategy is used with the IEC 61850
GOOSE protocol to exchange the DER status with voltage regulated devices
in DER and the existing field devices for advanced power distribution sys-
tems, and is validated using field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) based
real-time simulation [14]. The IEEE Std.2030.5, also referred to as Smart
Energy Profile 2.0 (SEP2), is the only communication protocol that requires
and implements cryptography [13].
However, no matter what kind of protocol is used, there is always a pos-
sibility of an attack and thus it is important to look at this from the cy-
berphysical point of view as well. Even if cryptography is used, an attacker
who has compromised an operator workstation in a control room can have
the commands issued from that workstation satisfy cryptographic require-
ments. Thus, there is need for detection and defense based on the analysis
of the potential physical impact of the operator commands such that it de-
fends against adversarial attack as well as operator error. The high impact
attacks on the power grid and similar systems have come from attackers first
compromising the organization. After that, they eventually hack into engi-
neering workstations from where they can send commands that do not just
impersonate the control center but legitimately come from the control center
which makes protocol security features less useful [15].
To accommodate reactive power participation from multiple DER, various
static and dynamic voltage regulation control strategies are used in reducing
the switching operations of voltage regulating devices and grid oscillatory
actions to improve voltage quality in the power distribution [16]. When
it comes to fault detection, due to the new standard mandating low volt-
age ride-through functionalities in inverters, a different approach is needed
5
in the detection of faults for low voltage ride-through. Measurements of
positive sequence voltage magnitude and root mean square (RMS) voltage
measurements were a few of the techniques explored. Due to the lag in de-
tecting RMS voltage measurements, it was concluded that using a Kalman
filter provides faster results in the detection of the operating regions of low
voltage ride-through [17]. Machine learning can also be used in the detection
and mitigation strategies for a system with attacked DER. For example, deep
reinforcement learning could be used as a tool to learn the optimal parame-
ters for the control logic of a set of non-compromised DER units to actively
mitigate the effects of a cyberattack on a subset of network DER [18].
In this thesis, a simple model of two aggregate DERs connected to the
AEPS, which may compose a significant fraction of total system generation
capacity, is considered. A simulation analysis of potentially adversarial com-
binations of modes that lead to voltage depression on a hypothetical AEPS
with varying degrees of DER penetration was conducted. It was concluded
that certain adverse mode changes, whether through error or cyberattack,
can lead to unstable conditions with DER penetration as low as 24% of
the AEPS system capacity. This is significantly lower than many currently
proposed Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) goals [19].
This observation helps in performing reachability analysis where the cur-
rent system states and candidate commands from the AEPS are considered.
Based on off-line power system analysis and simulation, reachability analysis
estimates the probability that an undesirable state is “reachable” from the
current state and the candidate command. If this is unacceptably high, it
is important to consider the command suspicious and block it from reaching
the DER controller. This technique can be used to implement a possible
state estimation strategy in situations where cybersecurity engineers with
limited resources need to deploy a firewall mechanism in a large bus sys-
tem on selected buses. It would be ideal to have all the nodes equipped
with sophisticated security mechanisms. However, due to economic and time
constraints, these security mechanisms may not be deployable to all nodes.
Thus, through the knowledge of state estimation, it would be easier to rank
nodes based on their DER penetration and the dire need to have the level of
security mechanism deployed.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The background on the
revised standard is summarized in Chapter 2. The system model is described
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in Chapter 3. Use cases and attack descriptions are explored in Chapter 4.
Results are shown in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 outlines ongoing and future work.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a summary.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND ON IEEE 1547 STANDARD
The motivation behind developing an updated standard for IEEE 1547 is
due to the growing penetration of DER. The original 2003 standard was
written at a time when the impact of DER on distribution systems was
unknown, so utilities took a conservative approach [7]. However, with high
penetration of DER becoming common and only expected to grow in recent
years, the revised version calls for mandatory, but adjustable, reactive power
support from the DER, as well as more permissive ride-through settings that
ensure DER will stay connected for small disturbances. Mandatory tripping
requirements are adjustable based on the AEPS calculation to maintain grid
resiliency. This is necessary due to the fact that the grid is relying on support
from several forms of DER. Therefore, IEEE 1547-2018 attempts to delineate
the required features and functionalities for any DER that is planning on
interconnecting with the grid and be a part of the larger AEPS.
2.1 Reference point of applicability
Reference point of applicability (RPA), as the name suggests, is the loca-
tion where the interconnection and interoperability performance require-
ments specified in this standard apply. The performance requirements in-
clude voltage and frequency monitoring and implement ride-through and trip
functionalities. Point of common coupling (PCC) is defined as the point of
connection between the AEPS and local electric power system (EPS) where
local EPS in this case is the DER. Point of connection (PoC), on the other
hand, is defined as the point where a DER unit is electrically connected in a
local EPS. The characteristics of the local EPS and DER shall determine if
the RPA will be PCC or PoC. However, if the impedance between the PoC
and PCC is less than 0.5% of the DER rated apparent power and voltage
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base, individual DER units that are considered fully compliant at the PoC
may be considered fully compliant at the PCC as well [8]. Throughout the
remainder of the thesis, PCC is chosen as the RPA.
2.2 Minimum reactive power capability
All DER are required to have reactive power injection and absorption capa-
bility as per the new IEEE 1547−2018 standard depending on over-excited
and under-excited states respectively. However, not all DER have the same
capability to absorb reactive power. For example, synchronous generators
have limitations to their reactive power absorption capability but are pre-
ferred technology for recovering energy from bio-gas, backup generation, and
other functions [7]. Thus to avoid excluding those types of DERs, the stan-
dard has defined two different categories of DER based on reactive power
capability. Category A has requirements that are feasible for all known DER
technologies to meet. Category B has enhanced requirements that are ben-
eficial to the power system, but may not be achievable by all technologies.
DER belonging to Category B, which is intended for systems with higher
DER penetration, must be able to inject and absorb at least 44% of the
nameplate apparent power rating of reactive power. All DER belonging to
Category A must be able to inject 44% and absorb 25% of the nameplate
apparent power rating of reactive power. This is to accommodate DER with
lower absorption capability and is deemed adequate for applications where
the DER penetration in the distribution system is lower [8].
Figure 2.1 shows minimum reactive power capability for Category A and
Category B DER as a function of active power output. If the active power
output is less than 5% of the rated active power, DER is not obligated to
provide any reactive power support. For active power output between 5%
and 20%, the DER shall be capable of exchanging reactive power up to the
44% (except for Category A absorption which would be 25% ) multiplied by
the active power output divided by 20% of rated active power. For example,
for Category B, at 5%, reactive power capability is calculated by 0.44∗0.05∗
Prated/(0.2 ∗ Prated) which comes out to be 0.11Srated and similarly, at 20%,
it comes out to be 0.44Srated, as is seen on the y-axis. When the DER is
providing active power at or above 20% of its rated capacity, the maximum
9
Figure 2.1: Minimum reactive power capability of Category A and B
DER [8]
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required reactive power absorption remains at 44% of the apparent power.
Since it is common for DER to be generating at least 20% of rated power
output, DER are assumed to be operating in that region of the chart for the
remainder of the thesis.
Note that operation at any active power output above 20% of rated active
power shall not constrain the delivery of reactive power injection or absorp-
tion, i.e., curtailment of active power to meet apparent power constraints is
permissible. The DER may produce active power up to the kVA rating pro-
vided that the DER remains capable at all times to absorb or inject reactive
power, to the full extent of the reactive power capability ranges as defined
in the standard. The DER Prated may be less than or equal to Srated and
the DER may need to reduce active power in order to meet the demanded
reactive power in order to respect its apparent power limits [8].
Table 2.1: Voltage and reactive/active power control function requirements
for DER normal operating performance categories
DER category Category A Category B






















Figure 2.2: Associated curve for default Watt-VAR mode
2.3 Operating modes
To be able to connect to the grid, the DER is supposed to have functional-
ities of being able to operate in certain modes. The standard specifies four
reactive power operating modes and one active power operating mode that
allows DER to support voltage and frequency at the PCC. Table 2.1 lists dif-
ferent types of reactive and active power modes for DER of Categories A and
B. Category A does not require Watt-VAR and Volt-Watt mode functional-
ities while Category B is mandated to have functionalities for all the modes
listed. Throughout the thesis, DER is assumed to be of Category B with the
minimum reactive power capability of 0.44 per unit (p.u.) of the apparent
power. This assumption is made because it gives flexibility to operate at any
mode. Note that the setpoints for the curves for each mode can be changed
by the AEPS operator. In the presence of no attack, the default values as
defined in the standard are assumed for the setpoints for all the modes.
Out of the four reactive power modes mentioned in Table 2.1, Constant
Power Factor mode, is the default set mode. With Constant Power Factor
mode, AEPS operator is able to set desired power factor as it fits the needs of
the grid. By default, it would be operating at a unity power factor. Voltage-
Reactive Power mode, commonly referred to as Volt-VAR mode, provides
the reactive power output based on voltage readings. Active Power-Reactive
Power mode, also known as Watt-VAR mode, provides reactive power output
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Figure 2.3: Associated curve for default Volt-Watt mode
based on active power output from the DER. That active power can either
come from maximum power point tracking (MPPT) controllers or from Volt-
Watt mode depending on the type of DER. An example curve is shown in
Figure 2.2, with reactive power injected when active power is absorbed and
reactive power absorbed when active power is injected. The last mode of
the reactive power modes is the Constant Reactive Power mode which sets a
single, fixed reactive power output when the mode is active. It is important
to note that these four reactive power modes are mutually exclusive; one and
only one may be selected at a time [8].
For the active power mode, there is only one option, which is the Volt-Watt
mode. As the name suggests, the active power is dependent on the voltage
readings based on the current PCC voltage. Only mandatory in Category B
DER, this mode can be enabled or disabled while one of the above reactive
power modes is enabled. An example of the curve with default setpoints for
this mode is shown in Figure 2.3, with maximum active power injected at
the nominal voltage and below, and absorbed only when the PCC voltage
is higher than the nominal voltage (nominal voltage is set as 1 p.u.). Note
that this curve is for DER that are able to both inject and absorb reactive
power. For the DER only able to inject power, the curve would have no
absorption levels below the x-axis, and instead have lower injection levels for
higher voltages.
Since the active power mode may be on or off as determined by the AEPS
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Figure 2.4: State representation of all the possible mode combinations
operator, there are 8 possible combinations for modes. Figure 2.4 depicts
the modes as different states numbered from 1 to 8 where states 1 to 4 on
the left side are where the active power mode is off, and states 5 to 8 are
where active power mode is on. State 1 highlighted in green is the default
state as defined in the standard with Constant Power Factor mode on and
active power mode off. Note that states 1 to 4 can go to any states from 5 to
8 and vice-versa. This is shown by the help of bidirectional arrows. As will
be shown later in this thesis, certain combinations of modes may result in a
situation where a voltage instability is introduced or exacerbated. In other
words, jumping from a certain state x to state y might be deemed harmful
and the adversary can exploit this to cause instability in the system. Also,
since the set-points for all the modes discussed above are adjustable within
certain limits, this adjustability exposes the system to potential adversary
attacks which shall be discussed more in Chapter 4.
2.4 Ride-through and trip settings
The rise of renewables also gives rise to fluctuations in the generation due to
the intermittent nature of sources of energy for renewables such as wind and
solar. The same can be said for consumption due to variation in the load.
The famous duck curve portrays very well how load profiles can be variable,
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and lots of forecasting tools have been pursued to predict how generation can
be coupled with consumption [20].
In addition to this capricious nature of loads and generation, different
disturbances can cause the overall grid to be unstable, and voltage and fre-
quency might not operate in nominal ranges. Breakers are usually designed
to detect such fluctuations and take necessary actions accordingly. As pre-
viously discussed, when IEEE 1547 was written in 2003, tripping off DER
when they faced any fluctuations would have sufficed to avoid further dam-
age. The abnormality in voltages and the degree of change over time that can
be sustained by devices led to the development of Computer and Business
Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA) and Information Technol-
ogy Industry Council (ITIC) curves [21]. Hence, ride-through and trip set-
tings are important in monitoring the power quality to increase the longevity
of electronic devices. However, with the rise of DER, the standard should be
able to define allowable ranges and times for DER to sustain ride-through
Figure 2.5: DER response to abnormal voltages and voltage ride-through
requirements for DER of abnormal operating performance Category III [8]
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during abnormal conditions to avoid loss of multiple DER.
Ride-through settings are therefore mandatory and they specify the amount
of time that a DER must remain connected to the AEPS during voltage or fre-
quency disturbances of certain magnitudes. The trip settings are adjustable
by the AEPS operator and it specifies the maximum allowable times to com-
pulsorily disconnect at times when nominal voltage or frequency thresholds
are way beyond the nominal values. In the range of voltage and frequency
between the ride-through requirements and the trip settings is a grey area
where the DER may trip or may ride through, depending on how conserva-
tive the trip settings are [22]. The standard lists three different categories
for varying ranges of tripping and ride-through settings. To take an exam-
ple, consider the voltage ride-through and trip settings for a Category III
DER as shown in Figure 2.5. While Category A and B classify DER based
on the reactive power and mode functional capabilities, Category I, II, and
III classify DER based on different ride-through and trip settings. The rea-
son Category III is chosen for the devised use cases is because this has the
least complicated ride-through and trip settings, and is the most permissive
setting among the three categories. The significance of permissive settings
becomes more evident when designing use cases and mitigation strategies.
The horizontal dashed line with y-axis as 1 p.u. denotes the nominal state
with no voltage deviations, and all these voltage regions apply at the RPA.
If the voltage stays between 0.88 p.u. and 1.1 p.u., DER do not have to trip
and can ride through for an infinite amount of time. If the voltage is between
1.1 p.u. and 1.2 p.u., then the DER has to ride through for 12 s. However,
if the voltage is more than 1.2 p.u., it has to trip within 0.16 s. Similar logic
applies to undervoltage conditions where the DER has to ride through for
21 s for voltages between 0.88 p.u. and 0.70 p.u., and for 10 s for voltages
between 0.5 p.u. and 0.7 p.u.. A similar idea is applied to Category I and
Category II with different settings.
Note that the default trip and ride-through settings as defined in the stan-
dard are used. Changing trip settings may cause adverse effects. The effects
of these changes are not discussed in detail in this thesis, although they are
the subject of ongoing work.
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2.5 Attacks on the DER interface
A part of the smart grid movement is the requirement to have proper commu-
nication interface with and among the DER. This project’s scope is limited
to attacks being made through changing commands via communication in-
terface to the DER. Communication with the DER can happen via various
industrial protocols. IEEE 1547 particularly identifies IEEE2030.5, DNP3,
61850 GOOSE, and Sunspec Modbus [8]. Adverse attackers would be using
these protocols to exploit the communication interface.
It is possible that bad combination of modes or incorrect setpoints and
commands leading to an unstable system could be the result of an accident
or initiated by an attacker with access to communication interface. Most of
the work of this thesis is concerned with the aftermath of receiving a mali-
cious command and is less concerned about the technical communication and
network details. However, other members of the team are looking into rel-
evant communication protocols, possible attacks through man-in-the-middle
or spoofing mechanisms, and possible mitigation strategies revolving around




The criteria and requirements of the IEEE 1547 standard are applicable to
all distributed energy resource technologies interconnected to EPS at typical
primary or secondary distribution voltage levels. As specified in Chapter 2,
the scope of the standard lies in the communication between the AEPS and
local EPS which could be DER, load, or the combination of both. Figure 3.1
shows various types of EPS involving DER and loads. The example of Local
EPS 1 includes only load. Any requirements for this Local EPS are outside
the scope of this standard.
The example of Local EPS 2 includes only DER. The DER unit in this ex-
Figure 3.1: Simplified model consisting of two DERs connected to the
AEPS [8]
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ample is able to meet requirements at its terminals without any supplemental
DER device. The example of Local EPS 3 includes both DER units and load.
The DER could be multiple and they are able to meet requirements at their
terminals without any supplemental DER device. Supplemental devices are
additional devices used to satisfy DER functionalities as mandated by the
standard in the case where DER is not self-sufficient [8]. The example of
Local EPS 4 includes a DER unit, a supplemental DER device, and load.
The example of Local EPS 5 includes two (or more) DER units and a supple-
mental DER device but no load. The curved line indicates that the PCC and
PoC may be located well apart from each other. Note that for all types of
Local EPS, depending on the aggregate DER units’ rating and the percent of
average load demand, requirements of the standard (voltage, frequency, trip
and ride-through) apply either at the PCC or the PoC [8]. The main differ-
ence that sets apart DER from microgrids is that a DER may not necessarily
be self-sustaining whereas microgrids are assumed to be self-sustaining.
Figure 3.2 shows a simplified system diagram with two DER circuits con-
nected to a larger AEPS. Each equivalent DER circuit may be thought of as
a DER plant (i.e. aggregate offshore wind or aggregate residential solar), a
microgrid with DER sources, or an individual DER. For the purposes of this
thesis, the focus is on DER that individually or combined make up a large
portion of the AEPS capacity. It is also of interest to see how DER may have
an impact on the bulk power system, but for preliminary studies, the focus
is on medium voltage systems.
For each DER circuit, a controller such as the eMesh SCADA from Hitachi
ABB Power Grids could act as both the substation remote terminal unit
(RTU) for all the communications within the DER circuit, and also as a
gateway that provides the local DER communication interface to the AEPS
operator [23]. The DER mode changes, curve parameters, tripping and ride-
through settings shall be all set by the AEPS operator using the local DER
communication interface for each of the DER circuits per the configuration
and management information as defined in the standard. Along with sending
configuration and management data, the AEPS operator shall also be able to
receive nameplate and monitoring information from each of the DER circuits
through their respective local DER interface. Finally, the major assumption
in all the following use cases is that the attacker only has access to the
information exchange between the AEPS and the local DER communication
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Figure 3.2: Simplified model consisting of two DERs connected to the
AEPS [22]
interface.
Each DER circuit consists of an inverter-controlled energy storage system
(ESS) that is capable of generating and absorbing both active and reactive
power. In Simulink, the AEPS is modeled as a three-phase synchronous gen-
erator source separated by a 10 km line from the two ESSs as direct current
(DC) voltage sources to simplify use case application and to utilize absorb-
ing and injecting functionalities of storage systems. The reason for having
two DERs instead of just one is to enable sophisticated mode changes that
could possibly take advantage of power-sharing between the two DERs [22].
Also, the idea of having multiple DERs becomes useful when it is necessary
to plan possible mitigation strategies where one DER might be compromised
and the other one can help to maintain the stability. Though not discussed in
this thesis, power-sharing becomes more relevant when considering islanding
conditions where AEPS requires support from DER to serve its load.
For this model description, each DER is provided a rating of 400 kVA and
the size of the AEPS is set as a variable ratio to the aggregate power rating
of the two DERs. This is done to test various levels of DER penetration.
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In the cases where there is low DER penetration, for instance, less than
1%, AEPS rating stays high which corresponds to a stiff grid. For such
cases, a stiff AEPS might act like an infinite bus with a fixated voltage of 1
p.u. However, considering the rise of penetration of renewables in the form of
DER, the ratio of DERs/AEPS is going to be higher as time progresses. This
is going to make the AEPS rely on DER for its overall stability and health.
Moreover, any change in DER is going to change the trajectories of voltage
and frequency at the PCC. The increase in DER penetration also means that
the AEPS is now more vulnerable to attacks or disturbances on DER. DER
could come in the form of photovoltaic (PV) inverters, wind plants, or just
ESS. These renewable resources are able to inject and absorb reactive power
through the use of smart inverters [24]. Ideally, for a system like a PV plant,
they would use MPPT to maximize the active power output. However, as
discussed in Chapter 2, when demanded from the AEPS operator, DER op-
erators might have to curtail their active power output to be able to regulate
reactive power. To simplify the system, two DERs as ESS are assumed to
have the minimum reactive power capability of Category B DER as defined
in the standard. This allows the implementation of the use cases without
having to worry about power curtailment requirements [22].
The controllers in both DERs consist of a grid-feeding converter and a
control layer governing mode change functionality, namely mode changes or
adjustments to the curve parameters [22]. In addition to be able to change
DC to alternating current (AC), inverters are now also required to have this
new mode change functionality as per the new IEEE 1547 standard. In the
case of grid-feeding converters, the reference values for currents are usually
provided by a power controller that regulates the active and reactive power
delivered to the grid [25]. For this system model, the power controller is tied
to a MATLAB script which is scripted to have mode change functionality.
Whenever, any mode is chosen, the Simulink and MATLAB script communi-
cate with each other to provide the power output reference values depending
on the mode chosen. The standard gives default setpoints for all the modes.
These default set-points were used to define functions in the MATLAB script
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Figure 3.3: Basic control structure in a three-phase grid-feeding power
converter [25]
to determine active and reactive power setpoints. Once the active and re-
active power values are determined based on the mode combinations, these
values serve as reference values for calculating the required current values to
be set by the inverter. The instantaneous active and reactive power compo-
nents are defined by
p = vd ∗ id + vq ∗ iq; q = vd ∗ iq − vq ∗ id (3.2)
This implementation of current controllers based on the dq synchronous
reference frame is commonly used in the control of AC currents in three-
phase systems [25]. The abc phase voltage coordinate system is converted to
dq0 reference frame where v0 is zero, vq component is driven to zero, and vd









These id and iq reference values are then fed to the converter as shown in
22
Figure 3.3 where id and iq go through proportional integral (PI) controllers
to match the reference values with the measured value. After that, the
reference values goes to pulse width modulation (PWM) and the filter to
finally connect to the AC grid, which in our case, is the AEPS.
In order to enable tripping and ride-through requirements, the AEPS and
two DERs have circuit breakers (CB) tied to distribution lines. A pi-circuit
transmission line model is used in Simulink to model the transmission line
parameters. Length of the transmission line between the AEPS and the point
of connection of DERs, is assigned to be 10 km. From the common point of
connection to two individual DERs, both transmission lines (from PCC A
to PoC A and PCC B to PoC B as shown in Figure 3.2) are assumed to be
0.5 km. This corresponds to a very small impedance that amounts to less
than 0.5% of the DER’s rated apparent power and voltage. Therefore, as
discussed in the previous section, the reference point of applicability for this
system model can be either the PoC or the PCC. This is evident when the
same voltage and frequency readings are measured at PoC and PCC because
of a short transmission line of 0.5 km with a low impedance. However, if
the transmission line was long and it exceeded the 0.5% threshold, different
readings would be seen at the PoC and the PCC [8].
All the loads in both the DERs side and the AEPS side are modeled as
constant loads consuming active and reactive power. In realistic scenarios,
the load profiles keep changing. The reason loads are modeled as constant is
to avoid mixing variables that change the trajectory of voltage and frequency.
Since the target is to see how certain use cases affect the system, using
constant loads guarantees that any changes seen in the system’s states are
due to the effect of implementation of those attack vectors from those use
cases. Having said that, depending on the use case, the constant load is
changed in such a way that the solution converges for all DER penetration
levels for any particular setup.
For the solver, Simulink’s powergui tool is used to discretize the system
for a solution at fixed time steps, and the Tustin/Backward Euler method is
used to carry out the simulations [26].
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Chapter 4
USE CASES AND ATTACK DESCRIPTION
Most of the time on this project was spent on devising the use cases to be
able to capture different attack vectors resulting from the communication
interfaces. Some of the use cases revolve around the idea that the AEPS
operator can access most of the real-time monitoring information from the
DER circuit. Thus, there could be scenarios where the attacker maliciously
falsifies some or all of the monitoring information from the DER circuit caus-
ing possible system instability and tripping. One of the items of monitoring
information that is provided to the AEPS operator via the local DER commu-
nication interface is the operational state of charge of the DER circuit which
can be falsely communicated by an adversary to potentially cause local load
shedding in the DER circuit along with possible frequency instability at the
PCC. Similarly, there could be multiple other use cases of false data injection
(FDI) which is part of an extensive work by other colleagues working in the
IEEE 1547 project.
Few other use cases revolve around the idea of changing combination of
modes or changing the set-points of Volt-Watt, Watt-VAR, Volt-VAR, and
Volt-Watt curves. Though the standard has default curves, the setpoints
can be changed by the AEPS operator within a predefined range and the
adversary can utilize this range of setpoints to cause adverse impacts. For
example, when operating on Volt-Watt mode, with both DER and AEPS
on low load conditions where DER are absorbing power from the AEPS, the
curves can be changed in the such a way that DER go from absorbing some
active power to absorbing zero active power. This change in operating mode
of the DER circuit from absorption (acting as a load) to no power output
further exacerbates the high voltage conditions at the PCC, causing high
voltage trip conditions and disconnecting the DER circuit from the AEPS.
In a situation where the AEPS was reliant on the DER circuit to perform
voltage regulation, the sudden tripping of the DER circuit can cause localized
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voltage instability issues on the AEPS. In the situation that this command
can be sent to many DER simultaneously, the high voltage scenarios that
cause tripping may trip off enough DER to have a significant impact on the
AEPS. Following the same notion, it is imperative to realize that system
topology is going to change the intensity of the aftermath of an attack be it
through changing the combination of modes or changing the curve parame-
ters. Possible attack vectors on the popular Volt-VAR curve and attack due
to malicious change in combination of modes are discussed in detail in this
chapter.
For all the use cases described, the magnitude of the voltage depression
varies with the dependency of AEPS on both DERs for active and reactive
power support. The use cases that will be discussed in detail are change in
modes or curves in reactive power modes. However, enabling the Volt-Watt
mode is not necessary to carry out these reactive power mode attacks. In
the case where Volt-Watt mode is off, the active power reference would come
from a tertiary controller, such as the MPPT, and is usually close to the
rated power.
The attack is split into two different steps. The first DER receives the
mode change or curve change malicious command at 2 s, and the second
DER receives the same malicious command at 5 s, depending on the use case.
These two time stamps are arbitrarily chosen and similar results are obtained
for any other arbitrarily chosen time stamps as well. This attack strategy
models a situation where the adversary changes the mode of all the connected
DERs, not precisely simultaneously, but within a short interval and hence
imitating a potential common mode change attack. Per unit convention is
used throughout the text and figures except for simulation results in Chapter
5 for frequency and reactive power output from both DERs. The base value
for apparent power is 400 kVA, and for voltage is 12 kV.
4.1 Change of set-points in Volt-VAR mode
The DER is assumed to be operating at the very commonly used Volt-VAR
mode which is one of the reactive power modes. Knowing the system dy-
namics is advantageous from the attacker’s standpoint but is not a necessary
condition to carry out the attack. The attacker can simply randomly change
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Figure 4.1: Associated curve for the default Volt-VAR mode
the set-points of the Volt-VAR curve so that these settings are used to control
the reactive power output. If the DER is not operating at Volt-VAR mode,
the attacker can always change the mode to Volt-VAR before maliciously
changing the curve settings. A default curve shape is shown in Figure 4.1
with Category B’s default settings. In this situation, reactive power is in-
jected in low voltage situations, which drives the voltage up towards nominal,
and reactive power is absorbed in high voltage situations, which drives the
voltage down towards nominal. However, there is a lot of leeway in the Q
and V setpoints, recognizing that based on the placement of the DER in the
AEPS, there may be a need to inject or absorb reactive power at nominal
voltage to correct for losses, or other unusual situations. A few malicious
curves that could be set by an attacker are theorized.
4.1.1 Manipulated Volt-VAR sawtooth curve
One of the most generically damaging settings would likely be a malicious
curve, as shown in Figure 4.2 where a very small deviation from nominal
voltage (between the range of V1 and V4) will cause swift changes in reactive
power output. Not only that, but a drop in voltage will cause reactive power
to be absorbed, which will further drive the voltage downward. Similarly,
with this malicious curve, an increase in voltage will cause reactive power
to be injected, which will further drive the voltage upward. As discussed
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Figure 4.2: Curve for Volt-VAR mode after the malicious setting
earlier, the AEPS operator can change the ride-through and trip parameters;
therefore, the attacker can set the undervoltage and overvoltage tripping
requirements narrowly which would result in DER tripping off sooner that
they are supposed to. This results in untimely tripping of DER even under
narrow voltage fluctuations. Note that there could be multiple combinations
of curves for this malicious setting with different slopes by changing the range
for the voltage as well.
4.1.2 Manipulated Volt-VAR curve to drive up the voltage
There are other possible settings that could also cause a similar, but more
targeted effect. For example, the settings in Figure 4.3 have all voltages set
at their maximum setting (Vref = 1.05 of VN and V1, V2, V3, and V4 set at the
high extrema of the given allowable range as defined in the standard), and all
reactive power at their maximum levels (100% injection for all points except
Q4, which has a maximum setting of 0). This means that for all voltages
below 1.08 p.u., the DER will inject maximum reactive power, driving the
voltage upwards. Above 1.08 p.u. reactive power will still be injected, at
lower rates, up to 1.23 p.u. voltage. Again, tripping requirements can be set
conservatively so that the system will be forced to trip [8]. These settings
could potentially be even more effective as an attack than the first. Despite
any external voltage deviations, the system will still inject maximum reactive
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Figure 4.3: Manipulated Volt-VAR curve to drive up the voltage
power at nominal voltage, which will start to drive the voltage up.
4.1.3 Manipulated Volt-VAR curve to drive down the voltage
Similar to the curve described above, the attacker can change the curve in a
way to drive the voltage down. For example, the settings in Figure 4.4 have
all voltages set at their minimum setting (Vref = 0.95 of VN and V1, V2, V3,
and V4 set at the low extrema of the given allowable range as defined in the
Figure 4.4: Manipulated Volt-VAR curve to drive down the voltage
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standard), and all reactive power at their minimum levels (100% absorption
for all points except Q1, which has a minimum setting of 0). This means
that for all voltages above 0.92 p.u., the DER will absorb maximum reactive
power, driving the voltage downwards. Below 0.92 p.u., reactive power will
still be absorbed, at lower rates, up to 0.77 p.u. voltage. This might be
more dangerous than driving the voltage high because the default tripping
setting for a Category III DER is 0.88 p.u. for undervoltage condition to
ride through for no more than 21 s. This is a difference of just 0.12 p.u.
from the nominal versus a difference of 0.20 p.u. (for overvoltage threshold
of 1.2 p.u.) for the default trip settings for a Category III DER. Thus, even
without changing the default tripping settings, the adversary can cause low
voltage situations that could lead to tripping of DER.
4.2 Malicious change of contradictory modes
Following the standard, the DER circuit can have simultaneous enabling of
the Volt-Watt mode along with any of the reactive power regulation modes.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Category B is used in areas with higher DER pen-
etration. Since varying levels of higher penetration of DER were considered
in these simulation studies, both of the DERs are assumed to be of Category
B. Also, Category B mandates all the modes. Two different scenarios are
considered to demonstrate the use case and attack description. Both scenar-
ios have the same attack path but different initial conditions. This use case
is relevant because the system begins with default conditions for the DER
in a typical operating normal grid system [22]. The attacks described in the
following sections could relate to either an adversary or just a human error.
4.2.1 Scenario 1: Both DERs operating with Volt-Watt mode
on and Constant Power Factor of 1
The default operating mode, as defined in the standard, is the unity power
factor mode and it resembles a scenario where voltage and frequency are at
nominal values and the system does not need support from DER. The active
power output is being regulated by Volt-Watt mode, and Constant Power
Factor mode is regulating the reactive power output at the PCC. In the case
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Figure 4.5: Attack showing change from Constant Power Factor mode to
Watt-VAR mode [22]
where Volt-Watt is disabled (as it would be as the default setting for active
power mode) and active power output is close to the rated power, this use
case would still remain valid. Note that a unity power factor means that the
DER circuit is not providing any reactive power support into AEPS. This
operating point is visible as point B in Figure 4.5.
The adversary sends a command to change the reactive power regulation
mode from Constant Power Factor to Watt-VAR without changing the Volt-
Watt setting. Figure 2.3 shows the regulation curve for the Volt-Watt mode,
where DER circuit would be generating the maximum rated active power
P1 at a voltage near or below the nominal 1 p.u. voltage. Note that the
curves are flexible, but default settings for Volt-Watt and Watt-VAR modes
are considered. When the mode changes from Constant Power Factor to
Watt-VAR, the active power output, determined by the Volt-Watt curve,
governs the reactive power output. Since Volt-Watt mode specifies maximum
power injection for any voltage near or below nominal, maximum real power
injection is expected. As shown in Figure 4.5, the system goes from point B to
point C after the attack, where point B is the operating point before attack of
a Constant Power Factor mode of 1 injecting rated active power of P3 and zero
reactive power. According to Watt-VAR mode, the reactive power output
of Category B DER would be set to maximum reactive power absorption,
or −0.44 p.u. at point C (P3, Q3) on the Watt-VAR curve assuming the
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apparent power rating of 1 p.u.. The change from the DER acting as a
neutral reactive power asset to absorbing maximum reactive power causes a
voltage depression at the PCC, and as DER penetration rises, the system
may enter an unstable operating region [22].
4.2.2 Scenario 2: Both DERs operating with Volt-Watt mode
on and Constant Power Factor of 0.9
A more severe scenario is imagined where the starting mode has both DERs
operating at a power factor of 0.9. A high DER penetration increases the
probability of all emergency scenarios concerning over- or under-voltage volt-
age situations because certain DER (solar, wind, etc.) are unpredictable and
intermittent [27], [28], [29], [30]. Undervoltage scenario could occur if these
resources produce less generation than projected. DER capable of injecting
power should be able to inject during situations as such [31]. Undervoltage
scenarios are typically solved with complex load shedding since large gener-
ators cannot ramp up quickly enough to fix the power mismatch [32], [33],
[34], [35]. However, if DER were being used to inject both active and reac-
tive power instead of performing load shedding, the reliability of the system
would be better. Therefore, this scenario is considered where two DERs are
operating as generating sources providing both active and reactive power
support in response to a system with higher load demand, specifically higher
reactive load demand. This scenario is shown as operating point A in Figure
4.5.
Similar to what was explained in Scenario 1, the adversary sends a com-
mand to change the reactive power regulation mode from Constant Power
Factor to Watt-VAR while the Volt-Watt mode is still active. According to
Watt-VAR mode, shown in Figure 2.2, after the attack of mode change has
been made, the final reactive power output would be set to point C which
is maximum reactive power absorption, or −0.44 p.u. at (P3, Q3) on the
Watt-VAR curve after starting at point A, which is the Constant Power Fac-
tor of 0.9. It can be postulated that the aftermath of this scenario will be
worse than the previous scenario, because the starting point with injection
of reactive power from both the DERs allows the system to start with higher
load.
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When the attack occurs and there is a sudden loss in reactive generation,
the AEPS becomes responsible for supporting even more reactive power since
the system started with a higher base load [22]. This will result in a voltage
depression at the PCC. In the condition where the net reactive power load,
the sum of base load and DER absorbing power, becomes large enough, the
system will cease to collapse. This is because AEPS will not be able to
support as many DER absorbing reactive power as in Scenario 1; system
collapse is expected to occur even under lower DER penetration.
4.3 Unfavorable regions
Another consideration is the unfavorable regions in the curves of Volt-VAR
or Watt-VAR mode. Taking Volt-VAR curve as shown in Figure 4.1 as an
example, with y-axis drawn vertically at the Vref point, anything in the first
and third quadrant is unfavorable. This is because as the voltage increases,
it is not wise to further increase the voltage by injecting the reactive power.
Similarly, as voltage drops below the reference voltage, it is not wise to absorb
the reactive power and further decrease the voltage. Knowing unfavorable
regions like these helps in the mitigation strategies where a simple rule based
algorithm could avoid attacks that fall into these unfavorable regions [36].
For the other use case mentioned above, the nature of point C in Figure 4.5
is unfavorable. It is evident that DER operating at point C act as reactive
power load consumption. The system remains stable with a low penetration
of DER operating at point C. However, as the ratio of DERs/AEPS increases,
the AEPS will not be large enough to provide enough reactive power to main-
tain a nominal voltage trajectory even after performing load-shedding to the
existing load in the system. To demonstrate this, 10 differently deterministic
simulations from point B to point C with varying power factors are consid-
ered to gauge the power factor and DERs/AEPS ratio at which the system
will end up operating in an unstable state. This is done for both load and no
load situations. To begin, it is assumed that the system is operating as de-
scribed in Scenario 1 with unity power factor with load on. This system with
load on is referred to as Situation 1. Then, the power factor is decreased in
the direction that follows from B to C with varying level of DER penetration.
The same procedure is repeated on a system that undergoes load-shedding
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Figure 4.6: Voltage trajectory for different DERs/AEPS ratio and different
power factors for Situation 1
and that system is referred to as Situation 2.
Figure 4.6 shows Situation 1 and Figure 4.7 shows Situation 2. Both figures
have ten differently colored lines for different power factors from 0.99 to 0.9
in the negative direction from B to C in the decrements of 0.1. The top blue
line in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 represents 0.99 p.f. and the bottom one represents
0.9 p.f.. The horizontal axis consists of varying level of DER penetration
with DERs/AEPS ratio ranging from 0 to 1. The voltage and frequency for
each DER penetration level (ranging from 0% to 100% in the increments of
5% ) for different power factors are sampled and then plotted in MATLAB.
Looking at the charts, it is obvious that the situation worsens as the power
factor is decreased and as the DERs/AEPS ratio is increased. Referring
back to Figure 4.5, the decrease in power factor from B to C translates
to both DERs generating active power and absorbing reactive power. As it
approaches closer to C, DER demand higher reactive power absorption which
corresponds to depression in voltage. This is what is reflected in Figures 4.6
and 4.7.
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Another dimension to note is that the magnitude of depression depends
on the ratio of DERs/AEPS. For instance, a low ratio of one or less than one
percent is too minuscule to cause any voltage depression due to the reduc-
tion in the operating power factor of the DER. In fact, DER are commonly
operated under Constant Power Factor mode or the power factor is adjusted
according to the active power feeding of the generating unit [37]. Thus, for a
low DER penetration, lowering power factor might not cause any significant
stability issues. However, as the DERs/AEPS ratio increases, the magnitude
of depression increases because then the system would be relying on DER
for reactive power. All DERs operating at this region of absorption would
surely depress the voltage. Hence, the depression is higher for high DER
penetration for all the power factors and gets worse for lower power factors.
The oscillations seen towards the end for higher DER penetration are the
results of voltage collapse due to high depression.
Note that the difference between Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 is that they are
representing Situation 1 and Situation 2 respectively, where Situation 1 has
Figure 4.7: Voltage trajectory for different DERs/AEPS ratio and different
power factors for Situation 2
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load and Situation 2 has no load as a result of load-shedding . Load-shedding
is a common solution when voltage depression occurs and is analogous to the
use of under-frequency load-shedding in other circumstances. As with under-
frequency load-shedding, undervoltage load-shedding provides protection for
unusual disturbances outside planning and operating criteria [38]. Though
load-shedding is not the most viable solution for voltage depression, this sce-
nario is used as Situation 2 to demonstrate the outcome even after performing
load shedding. It is clear that the magnitude of voltage depression is signifi-
cantly decreased for Situation 2 due to the load-shedding. However, as shown
in Figure 4.7, as the power factor decreases and DER penetration increases,
load-shedding will no longer be a viable solution. Thus, mitigation strategies
involving the knowledge of the state of the system and DERs/AEPS ratio
are needed in blocking attacks that are deemed to cause instability.
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Chapter 5
SIMULATION RESULTS AND FINDINGS
Two hundred different Monte Carlo simulations were conducted with varying
DER penetration for all the use cases proposed in the earlier chapter 1. Monte
Carlo is often used in reachability analysis to explore the effect on the trajec-
tory of the states due to a change in certain parameters [39]. The parameters
subject to change are the randomly generated ratios of DERs/AEPS. The
trajectories that are of interest are of voltage and frequency at the PCC due
to the attack over the course of time. After running the simulations, voltage
and frequency are observed at the PCC because those two states serve as the
indicators of stability.
The top graph in Figures 5.1 to 5.5 shows reactive power output from both
DERs, measured in kVAR, over the course of 10 s with changes at 2 s and 5
s due to two-step attacks as discussed in Chapter 4. The graph in the middle
shows voltage trajectory at the PCC, measured in p.u., over the course of
10 s with changes at 2 s and 5 s. And lastly, the bottom graph shows the
frequency trajectory at the PCC, measured in Hz, over the course of ten
seconds with changes at 2 s and 5 s.
Note that simply using deterministic methods to generate ratios of DERs/AEPS
from 0 to 100 percent would have sufficed to observe the voltage and fre-
quency trajectories for different levels of DER penetration. However, the rea-
1This material is based upon work supported by the Department of Energy under
Award Number DE-OE0000896. Disclaimer: This thesis was prepared as an account
of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United
States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any war-
ranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy,
completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or
represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any
specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer,
or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or
favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions
of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or any agency thereof.
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son for using stochastic method lies in finding the critical ratios of DERs/AEPS
ratio to find the cut-off ratios for feasible operation under different operating
conditions. This is discussed more in detail later in Sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.2.
5.1 Change of set-points in Volt-VAR mode
As was discussed previously, there could be multiple variations of attack by
changing the curve of Volt-VAR mode. Three possible curve settings were
considered which were implemented in Simulink to see the effect on trajectory
of voltage and frequency at the PCC.
Figure 5.1 shows simulation results of the manipulated Volt-VAR saw-
tooth curve, Figure 5.2 shows results of the manipulated voltage curve that
drives the voltage up and Figure 5.3 shows results of the manipulated voltage
curve that drives the voltage down. Each line represents a different ratio of
DERs/AEPS and the effect of the curve changes on voltage and frequency
at the PCC over 10 s. The top graphs in all figures show the reactive power
measurements (in kVAR) from both DERs where a positive value indicates
generation, a negative value indicates absorption, and 0 kVAR simply indi-
cates neither absorption nor generation. Since both DERs were operating at
Volt-VAR mode under nominal conditions (voltage of 1 p.u. and frequency
of 60 Hz), no VAR support was required from either DER before the attacks.
At the 2 s mark, when the first attack takes place through malicious curve,
the first DER’s reactive power output rapidly changes, and at the 5 s mark,
the second DER does the same. This change in the reactive power support
is reflected in the voltage and frequency readings at the PCC. Note that the
fast response time of power controllers is common in modern inverters due
to improved power electronics [40].
5.1.1 Findings from Monte Carlo simulation
There are three potential outcomes of the simulation: continuous operation,
oscillation of voltage, and trip after a sustained ride-through.
The first outcome results in the system still operating in the continuous
operating mode, though at a slightly different state than the initial state.
37
Figure 5.1: DERs operating at Volt-VAR mode being attacked with the
malicious sawtooth curve
The second outcome results in the system operating within the voltage
range of ride-through and trip settings but oscillating up and down within
few cycles. This kind of outcome would cause a lot of stress to the grid and
compromise stability.
The third outcome would be either voltage depression or high voltage de-
pending on the type of malicious curve designed to either drive down or drive
up the voltage. The time to activate trip commands varies according to the
category of the DER used [8]. For this model, both DERs are assumed to be
of Category III, the most robust category as defined in the standard, to show
that even the DER with the most permissive default trip settings are affected
by this adverse attack. For example, as shown in Figure 2.5, if the PCC volt-
age is between 0.70 p.u. and 0.88 p.u., a Category III DER is required to
sustain undervoltage ride-through for a minimum of 21 s. Similarly, for the
high voltage scenario, a Category III DER is required to sustain overvoltage
ride-through for a minimum of 13 s for voltages above 1.10 p.u.. Though the
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Figure 5.2: DERs operating at Volt-VAR mode being attacked to drive up
the voltage
voltage results shown in simulations are only for 10 s, simulations of longer
duration indicated that once the voltage drops or drives up, it does not re-
cover. With no voltage support from other devices, the voltage depression or
high voltage cannot be mitigated and hence it will trip after the ride-through.
A lot of oscillations can be seen in voltage and frequency trajectories for
the malicious sawtooth curve as shown in Figure 5.1 for higher DER penetra-
tion. This makes sense looking at the shape of the malicious curve shown in
Figure 4.2. Because of the slope around the nominal voltage, there are many
oscillations in the states due to change of reactive power from absorption
to generation and vice-versa. The magnitude of oscillations increase as the
DER penetration ratio increases. The attack made at 2 s changes DER 1’s
reactive power mode curve to the malicious setting which, depending on the
voltage trajectory, is going to either absorb reactive power (when voltage is
low) or inject reactive power (when voltage is high). In response to that,
DER 2 (which is not attacked yet) follows the default Volt-VAR to inject re-
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Figure 5.3: DERs operating at Volt-VAR mode being attacked to drive
down the voltage
active power (when voltage is low) and absorb reactive power (when voltage
is high).
This constant change causes oscillations in voltage. Though not shown in
the graph, this also leads to slight change in active power output fluctuations
due to Volt-Watt being enabled. The reactive power from two DERs fighting
with each other coupled with slight fluctuations in active power output is the
reason why more fluctuations are seen in the frequency trajectories between 2
s and 5 s. After 5 s, DER 2 also gets compromised and hence resonates with
the reactive power output of DER 1. The voltage oscillations and frequency
oscillations are reduced significantly but there are still fluctuations present
in smaller range. The aftermath of the second attack on DER 2 results in
voltages being driven either down or up.
Figure 5.2, the result of the malicious curve intended to drive the voltage
up, shows voltage being driven up for all the simulations and rising with
higher intensity as the DER penetration increases. This becomes more ev-
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ident looking at the reactive power graph of two DERs. DER 1’s reactive
power shown by the blue line goes from zero injection of reactive power to
full injection of 0.44 p.u. (176 kVAR) after the attack made at 2 s with the
malicious curve intended to drive up the voltage. At this point, DER 2 is
not compromised and it can be seen that the DER 2 tries to absorb reactive
power following the default Volt-VAR curve to bring down the voltage. The
amount of absorption from DER 2 varies with the DER penetration and it
can be seen in the gradient in the figure for varying levels of DER penetra-
tion. At 5 s attack, DER 2 also gets compromised with the malicious curve
driving the voltage up which compels the DER controller to inject maximum
reactive power of 0.44 p.u. (176 kVAR) worsening the voltage trajectory by
driving the voltage even higher.
Similarly, Figure 5.3, the result of the malicious curve intended to drive the
voltage down, shows voltage being driven down for all the simulations and
dropping with higher intensity as the DER penetration increases. This again
becomes more evident looking at the reactive power graph of two DERs.
DER 1 shown by the blue line goes from zero injection of reactive power to
full absorption of 0.44 p.u. (176 kVAR) after the attack made at 2 s with the
malicious curve intended to drive down the voltage. At this point, DER 2 is
not compromised and it can be seen that the DER 2 tries to inject reactive
power following the default Volt-VAR curve to bring up the voltage. The
amount of injection from DER 2 varies with the DER penetration and it is
apparent from the gradient in the figure for varying levels of DER penetra-
tion. At 5 s attack, DER 2 also gets compromised with the malicious curve
driving the voltage down which compels the DER controller to inject reactive
power. Due to the way the malicious curve was set, DER 2 will be absorbing
a certain amount of reactive power as set by the slope of the malicious curve
which results in worsening the voltage trajectory by driving the voltage even
lower. For different DER penetration, the gradient is seen for DER 2 reactive
power absorption, with absorption being higher for higher DER penetration.
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5.1.2 Findings on critical DER penetration ratios
Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 show critical ratios of DERs/AEPS where a two-step
attack alters the nominal operating condition for various levels of DER pene-
tration. Table 5.1 indicates that in a system where the DERs/AEPS ratio is
less than 22%, the system may operate continuously in a state different than
in the nominal state. However, a system with a DERs/AEPS ratio of more
than 22% is going to cause oscillations in the grid as was discussed earlier.
Table 5.2 shows there are no critical ratios for the malicious curve driving
Table 5.1: Critical DERs/AEPS percentages for the malicious sawtooth
curve









No attack 0% – 100% N/A N/A
First attack 0% – 22% 22% – 100% N/A
Second attack 0% – 22% 22% – 100% N/A
Table 5.2: Critical DERs/AEPS percentages for the curve that drives up
the voltage









No attack 0% – 100% N/A N/A
First attack 0% – 100% N/A N/A
Second attack 0% – 100% N/A N/A
Table 5.3: Critical DERs/AEPS percentages for the curve that drives down
the voltage









No attack 0% – 100% N/A N/A
First attack 0% – 100% N/A N/A
Second attack 0% – 34% N/A 34% – 100%
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up the voltage. This means that even for max penetration of 100%, the
voltage does not exceed 1.10 p.u. for it to initiate any trip commands. This
does not mean that this curve is innocuous. The voltage rises as high as 1.08
p.u. for high DER penetration. It is not good for the grid to be operating
at high voltages for a long time and this might cause equipment damage
following the idea of CBEMA curve [21].
In Table 5.3, for the malicious curve driving down the voltage, the last
row indicates that in a system where the DERs/AEPS ratio is less than
34%, the system may survive a two-step attack. However, a system with a
DERs/AEPS ratio of more than 34% is going to sustain a low voltage ride-
through for some time. During this time, other devices on the AEPS with
the voltage support capability may respond and help restore the voltage, a
step that is left for future work. However, without any voltage support, DER
are going to trip after 21 s for a Category III DER. This tripping of DER
will cause not only load-shedding but also grid instability upon losing more
than 34% of the DER that were initially supporting the grid.
5.2 Malicious change of contradictory modes
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show Monte Carlo simulation results carried out in MAT-
LAB, where each line represents a different ratio of DERs/AEPS and the
effect of the mode changes on voltage and frequency at the PCC over 10 s
for both scenarios of 1 p.f. and 0.9 p.f. [22]. The top graphs in both figures
show the reactive power measurements (in kVAR) from both DERs where
a positive value of 176 kVAR (+0.44 p.u.) indicates generation, a negative
value of 176 kVAR (−0.44 p.u.) indicates absorption, and 0 kVAR simply in-
dicates neither absorption nor generation. Simulations with unequally sized
DER were also carried out and the results were qualitatively similar [22].
At 2 s, when the first mode change takes place, the first DER’s reactive
power output rapidly changes from no-generation to absorption for Scenario
1 as shown in Figure 5.4 and from generation to absorption for Scenario 2 as
shown in Figure 5.5. At 5 s, the second DER does the same. This change in
the reactive power support is reflected in the voltage and frequency readings
at the PCC.
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Figure 5.4: DERs with Volt-Watt mode on and Constant Power Factor of
1 [22]
5.2.1 Findings from Monte Carlo simulation
For the results of this particular use case of combination of modes, there are
three potential outcomes of the simulation: continuous operation, trip after
a sustained ride-through, and voltage and frequency collapse.
The first outcome consists of small transients that result in the system still
operating in the continuous operating mode. This means that system states
might have changed but not enough to cause any immediate damage to the
system. In this outcome, there are, however, a few cases where the voltage is
close to 0.88 p.u.. This undervoltage condition is still concerning and could
affect electronic devices. The cases of this first outcome corresponding to
lower levels of DER penetration can be seen on the top portion of the 200
simulations shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.
The second outcome is voltage depression at the PCC that the system
tries to ride through but eventually must trip due to the absence of volt-
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Figure 5.5: DERs with Volt-Watt mode on and Constant Power Factor of
0.9 [22]
age recovery. This outcome is similar to the outcome explained earlier for
the use case of malicious Volt-VAR curve driving the voltage down causing
the voltage to ride through low voltage and trip after certain time. Note
that this outcome resulting in tripping after a certain time varies with the
category of DER used, and the assumption that it will trip after a certain
time comes from the lack of intelligent automated reactive power support
from non-compromised DER. Using non-compromised DER intelligently as
a mitigation strategy to prevent this outcome is part of the future work and
is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. The cases resulting in this outcome can
be seen in the Figures 5.4 and 5.5 right in middle of those 200 simulations.
The third outcome is the result of power mismatch causing the operat-
ing point to be unstable, leading to voltage and frequency collapse. These
transients will not last long due to strict tripping requirements for high fluc-
tuations in voltage and frequency readings at the PCC. A Category III DER,
by default, should trip after 2 s when voltage drops below 0.50 p.u. or after
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0.16 s when frequency rises above 62 Hz [8]. The resulting cases for the third
outcome can be seen in the trajectory of frequencies shooting beyond 62 Hz
and with voltage collapsing. Instead of showing non-converging solution of
oscillating voltage trajectories, the voltage trajectories for the third outcome
are shown as approaching zero, and frequency shooting upwards, for better
legibility of the figure. This corresponds to immediate tripping after the
breakers detect low voltage and high frequency readings. It is evident that
these cases happen in simulations where DER penetration is higher. The
ratios for which this outcome is caused, along with ratios for first and second
outcomes, are discussed in Section 5.2.2.
The time difference for the DER to trip sets apart the second and third out-
come. Since the third outcome occurs almost immediately, it would be harder
to implement mitigation strategies for the third outcome than it would be
for the second outcome. Also, the third outcome is the result of voltage and
frequency collapse which can be best avoided by DPI and stronger firewall
measures rather than system-level physical mitigation strategies.
The differences in voltage and frequency trajectories can be seen between
Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. The range of frequency fluctuations is higher for
Scenario 2 than it is for Scenario 1. The difference in the results between two
scenarios is more noticeable in the voltage trajectories where larger voltage
depression is noticed in Scenario 2 compared to that in Scenario 1. This
confirms the speculation that the AEPS reliance on both DERs to inject
reactive power in high load scenarios is prone to more adversarial impacts
due to the state of both DERs going from injection to absorption versus no
reactive power support to reactive power absorption.
5.2.2 Findings on critical DER penetration ratios
As discussed earlier in the chapter, one of the main objectives to carry out
these stochastic simulations, with randomly generated DER penetration lev-
els, is to find out the critical ratios where different resulting outcomes would
be seen. This is more relevant for this particular use case involving combina-
tion of modes because of higher sensitivity on the trajectories of voltage and
frequency for varying levels of DER penetration. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show
critical ratios of DERs/AEPS where a two-step attack alters the nominal
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Table 5.4: Critical DERs/AEPS percentages for Scenario 1 (both DERs
operating at a p.f. of 1) [22]









No attack 0% – 100% N/A N/A
First attack 0% – 48% 48% – 63% 63% – 100%
Second attack 0% – 24% 24% – 48% 48% – 100%
operating condition.
In Table 5.4, for example, the last row indicates that in a system where
the DERs/AEPS ratio is less than 24%, the system may survive a two-
step attack. This means the system will remain in continuous operating
region with different voltage and frequency trajectories but within the range
without causing direct instability in the system. However, a system with a
DERs/AEPS ratio of anywhere between 24% and 48% is going to sustain
ride-through for some time. During this time, other devices on the AEPS
with the voltage support capability may respond and help restore the voltage,
a step that is left for future work. However, without any support, it is
deemed to trip after a few seconds. The worst-case scenario would be when
the DERs/AEPS ratio crosses 48% and the attack causes the system to trip
immediately. This is the third outcome discussed in the prior section where
the system operator would have no chance to mitigate and the AEPS would
lose a large portion of its capacity, resulting in system instability and load-
shedding.
Following up on to the speculation from the previous section, Table 5.5
shows unfavorable conditions for DER penetration as low as 14%, 10% lower
than the unfavorable conditions for Scenario 2. This is because Scenario 1
had a higher load demand to begin with and was relying on reactive power
injection from both DERs. Thus, the attack becomes more successful even
with lower penetration.
The only anomaly in this table lies in a comparatively lower tripping
threshold of 63% for Scenario 1 compared to 73% for Scenario 2 after first
attack. This is primarily because the rate of voltage depression is higher right
after the first attack for Scenario 1 and is significant enough to cause volt-
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Table 5.5: Critical DERs/AEPS percentages for Scenario 2 (both DERs
operating at a p.f. of 0.9) [22]









No attack 0% – 100% N/A N/A
First attack 0% – 34% 34% – 73% 73% – 100%
Second attack 0% – 14% 14% – 36% 36% – 100%
age collapse sooner than the system’s inertial response and Simulink solver’s
time response [22]. This does not happen for the second attack because by
the time second attack hits, the voltage is already depressed enough. There-
fore, the solver and inertial response work as expected. To help explain
these anomalies more mathematically, part of the future work also involves
detailing the model in a more granular way.
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Chapter 6
ONGOING AND FUTURE WORK
The current trends of DER penetration serve as motivation to focus on two
aspects in parallel: identifying potential cybersecurity threat vectors that
might destabilize the system, and finding mitigating solutions for distur-
bances arising from either cyberattacks, human errors, or naturally occurring
faults and disturbances [22]. The simulation results from one of the use cases
(change of combination mode case: Scenario 1) show that even an attack on
default nominal operating conditions can cause significant issues with pene-
tration as low as 24% of the AEPS system capacity. With current RPS goals
calling for high penetration of renewables, this number is concerning.
As a part of ongoing work, the team is trying to implement the use cases
discussed in this thesis in a hardware-in-the-loop setting using tools such
as OPAL−RT. This is to see the real-time effects of this attack. Though
OPAL−RT supports hardware in the loop, there are no 1547-compliant DER
controllers yet that could be put in the loop to test these use cases. However,
using OPAL−RT at least allows the implementation of mitigation strategies
in real time as well to compare the timing and efficacy of different strategies
for different attack vectors.
The ongoing work also involves developing rule based data inspection tools
using a Python script that receives and sends network traffic. The receiv-
ing network traffic could be commands that are either benign or malicious.
The script then performs heuristic analysis which could be a simple rule-
based method but could also potentially utilize sophisticated machine learn-
ing methods. After the analysis is done, the script then rejects or forwards
the packets to be sent to the simulated AEPS. The simulated AEPS can be
either in Simulink or OPAL−RT. Since these use cases are not time sensitive,
MATLAB should be sufficient for now. However, if it was needed to imple-
ment voltage support and incorporate timers to check for ride-through and
tripping requirements, OPAL−RT might be essential. The dynamics of the
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combined system can then be tested with reachability analysis to validate
benign configurations or detect susceptibility to malicious commands that
could lead to abnormal and unstable states.
To mitigate the outcome of a sustained ride-through until mandatory trip
is required, one way to implement a mitigation strategy would be by deploy-
ing non-compromised DER to compensate for the attack on compromised
DER. This could be done through a control logic that determines the mit-
igating mode combination and optimal set-points associated with it. Miti-
gating strategies with Volt-VAR support can be used for the first use cases
discussed regarding malicious Volt-VAR curves [41]. Using centralized Volt-
VAR optimization strategy against malicious attack on control of DER can
lead to an optimal operation of the system [42].
For the Scenario 2 in the change of combination of modes use case (both
DERs starting with a p.f. of 0.9), a mitigation strategy can be considered
where there is a system with n DERs where x is the number of DERs that
have been compromised. This means the overall system is left with n − x
DERs to mitigate issues. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that
all the DERs meet the minimum absorption requirement of 0.44 p.u. of the
apparent power for all the n DERs. Also, it can be assumed that the x
DERs that were compromised were operating with active power mode on
and reactive power mode on with the Constant Power Factor of 0.9. This
resembles a situation where the AEPS operator is relying on those x DERs to
inject reactive power to maintain the nominal voltage while the n− x DERs
are just operating at the default mode as defined in the standard, which is
the Constant Power Factor mode for the reactive power mode. The active
power mode is usually off and is turned on when there is a possibility of high
voltage situations. For this case, it is assumed that the active power mode
is on because that means the active power output for nominal and less than
nominal voltage levels are set to be 0.9 p.u. which gives the space for 0.44
p.u. of reactive power capability. The active power mode might as well have
been turned off and the active power production could have been limited as
reactive power production is increased, but the former approach is simpler
to work with.
For this example of mode change resulting in generation to absorption, the
mitigation lies in raising the voltage to the nominal value. This means that
raising the voltage is achieved by injection of reactive power from n−x DERs.
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In this example case, the mitigation is guaranteed if n− x >= 2 ∗ x because
of the nature of the use case which turns x DERs reactive power state from
generation to absorption which means it needs 2 ∗ x DERs to compensate
for that sudden change of reactive power. For cases where n − x <= 2 ∗ x
but close to 2 ∗ x, DERs may reach close to the nominal voltage within the
threshold. One could either deploy all non-compromised n−x DERs in raising
the voltage or use selective compensation. With the selective compensation
mitigation strategy, instead of choosing all n − x DERs to participate in
reactive power injection, only a few of the n − x DERs would be chosen to
help with mitigation. This is very useful when some DER have a high active
power output, such as solar plants on a sunny day, and other DER produce
little active power, such as solar plants with cloud spots or wind plants with
very weak wind profile in that particular time. It would not be efficient to
decrease the active power production in order to provide reactive power for
DER with potentially high power output. Instead, DER producing low active
power output can be leveraged to participate in the reactive power injection
which would not require capping the active power.
While a simplistic model is used to demonstrate the use cases, it is evident
that these use cases remain valid for larger systems with multiple DER as
well. The two DERs used in the system can be thought of as groups of DER
such as PV, wind, and storage devices. These use cases and implementation
can be translated to a bigger system with different kinds of DER and longer
transmission lines among the DER in order to imitate a more realistic system.
The system model can be explained mathematically to be able to sub-
stitute Monte Carlo simulations with a sensitivity analysis that determines
confidence intervals for states’ trajectories (voltage and frequency for in-
stance) with respect to several participation factors [43]. With the help of
confidence intervals for each use case and its attack vectors, it saves a lot
of computational time. The AEPS operator would also be able to carry out
several what-if scenarios for different use cases. Without the need to compu-
tationally run simulations, it also helps in examining ride-through and trip
functionalities for longer simulation duration and coupling the simulations
to test any possible mitigation strategies.
Digging deeper into the new functionalities of the IEEE 1547 is going to
help come up with more use cases. Developing use cases revolving around
FDI, changing the ride-through and trip parameters, access to monitoring in-
51
formation, combination of modes and change in settings of modes will enable
the AEPS operator to recognize vulnerability. Devising use cases and imple-
menting the use cases with real-time simulations will help in understanding
the severity of several attack vectors. This study will be useful to developing





The IEEE 1547 standard plays a vital role in addressing the interconnection
requirements of DER into the main grid. It is necessary to think of this
standard as a living document subject to change in the years to come. The
research work presented in this thesis is intended to give a glimpse at possi-
ble threats and their consequences that could arise with the advent of new
functionalities. Due to changing nature of grid modernization, standards
are prone to change. This means that a special emphasis should be placed
on the continuous research and development of several use cases and attack
vectors, and their ramifications as regulatory bodies keep updating policies,
standards and regulations.
While the requirements of interfaces in smart inverters are intended to
make the grid smarter, smart inverters also expose the grid to several cyber-
security threats, some of which were discussed in detail in this thesis. As
RPS goals increase the share of renewables in the grid, and as the invert-
ers connecting the renewables to the grid get smarter, it is vital to make
the grid more secure and resilient against any possible cyberadversaries or
human error.
The results from the research show that attacks or human errors made
in systems with DER penetration as low as 24% for default operating con-
ditions, or as low as 14% for some special scenarios, lead to unfavorable
conditions. Therefore, the use cases mentioned in the thesis and the results
following from those might help smart grid researchers to prevent instability
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